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THREE PICTURES OF GOD IN 
WESTERN THEOLOGY 
Thomas Talbott 
I begin with an inconsistent set of three propositions, each of which has the 
following characteristic: We can find prima facie support for it in the Bible. 
I then classify theologians according to which proposition they reject, and I 
identify three different pictures of God: the Augustinian picture, the Arminian 
picture, and the universalist picture. Finally, I explore some hermeneutical 
problems and suggest a way in which those who hold the universalist picture 
might interpret some of the texts upon which the doctrine of eternal punish-
ment has traditionally rested. 
A cardinal doctrine of the Christian faith is that God, being a loving Creator, 
is at work in the world redeeming sinners-that is, reconciling to himself 
those who have fallen into moral corruption. But Christians have often dis-
agreed among themselves about the extent and the ultimate success of God's 
redemptive activity, and these disagreements reflect surprisingly different 
conceptions of the divine nature. The conceptions are so different, indeed, 
that some may even wonder whether all Christians worship the same God. 
Here is a relatively easy way to understand these issues and to organize 
our thinking about them. We begin with an inconsistent set of three propo-
sitions: 
(l) It is God's redemptive purpose for the world (and therefore his will) to 
reconcile all sinners to himself; 
(2) It is within God's power to achieve his redemptive purpose for the world; 
(3) Some sinners will never be reconciled to God, and God will therefore 
either consign them to a place of eternal punishment, from which there 
will be no hope of escape, or put them out of existence altogether. 
In calling this an inconsistent set of propositions, I assume, of course, that 
the foHowing is necessarily true: If it is God's redemptive purpose to recon-
cile all sinners to himself and it is within his power to accomplish that 
purpose, then he will indeed reconcile all sinners to himself. If this is nec-
essarily true, then at least one of the above propositions is false. 1 
Next, we observe the following: Although at least one of the propositions 
above is false, we nonetheless find theological arguments in support of each 
of them; we also find texts in the Bible which may appear, at least initially, 
to support each of them. In support of proposition (1), for example, we find 
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such texts as II Peter 3:9: "The Lord ... is not willing that any should perish, 
but that all should come to repentance" (KJV); I Timothy 2:4: God "desires 
all men to be saved and to come to the knowledge of the truth"; Romans 
11 :32: "For God has imprisoned all in disobedience so that he may be 
merciful to all" (NRSV); and Ezekiel 33:11: "As I live, says the Lord God, 
I have no pleasure in the death of the wicked, but that the wicked turn away 
from his way and live .... " All of these texts seem to suggest that God 
sincerely wants to achieve the reconciliation of all sinners, and that his failure 
to achieve this end would therefore be, in some important sense, a tragic 
defeat of one of his purposes. 
Similarly, in support of proposition (2), we find such texts as Ephesians 
I: II: God "accomplishes all things according to the counsel of his own will"; 
Job 42:2: "I know that thou canst do all things, and that no purpose of thine 
can be thwarted"; Psalm 115:3: "Our God is in the heavens; he does whatever 
he pleases"; and Isaiah 46: lOb & lib: "My counsel shall stand, and I will 
accomplish all my purpose ... I have spoken, and I will bring it to pass; I 
have purposed, and I will do it." These texts seem to imply that God is able 
to accomplish all of his purposes-including, therefore, his redemptive pur-
poses. And, in addition to these texts, a number of others seem to imply that 
God has both the will and the power to bring all things into subjection to 
Christ (I Corinthians 15:27-28), to reconcile all things in Christ (Colossians 
1 :20), and to bring acquittal and life to all persons through Christ (Romans 
5: 18). 
But finally, in support of proposition (3), we also find such texts as Matthew 
25:46: "And they will go away into eternal punishment, but the righteous 
into eternal life"; II Thessalonians I :9: "They shall suffer the punishment of 
eternal destruction and exclusion from the presence of the Lord and from the 
glory of his might ... "; and Ephesians 5:5: "Be sure of this, that no immoral 
or impure man, or one who is covetous (that is, an idolater), has any inheri-
tance in the kingdom of Christ and of God." These texts may seem to imply 
that at least some persons will be lost forever and thus never be reconciled 
to God. 
Lest there should be any confusion in the matter, I should perhaps point 
out at this point that I make no claim, in the present context, about the correct 
interpretation of any of the texts I have just cited. Neither do I make any 
claim about the appropriateness of lifting isolated texts from very different 
contexts and setting them side by side, as if one could somehow adduce 
evidence thereby for the content of revealed truth. I merely make the point 
that various texts in the Bible may initially appear to support, and in fact 
have been cited on behalf of, each of our three propositions. With respect to 
each of them, some theologians and Bible scholars have concluded that it is 
a fundamental-not a peripheral, but a fundamental-teaching in the Bible. 
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But as a matter of logic, not all of them can be true; at least one of them is 
false. So if we consider the matter purely as an exercise in logic-that is, 
without considering any textual evidence at all-we confront this alternative: 
We can say, on the one hand, that the Bible teaches all three propositions and 
is not, therefore, infallible in all of its teachings; or we can say, on the other 
hand, that the Bible is indeed infallible in all of its teachings, but does not 
really teach all three propositions. In either case, those who believe that God 
has revealed himself in the Bible will face essentially the same hermeneutical 
problem; that is, essentially the same problem of interpreting the Bible as a 
whole: They must provide an interpretive structure that avoids a fundamental 
logical inconsistency in what they take to be the revealed truth about God. 
The Emergence of Three Different Pictures 
Now a good way to classify Christian theologians and their theological sys-
tems, I want to suggest, is according to which of our three propositions they 
finally reject. Of course, a theologian could always remain a skeptic on this 
question, but such skepticism would tend to undermine the entire discipline 
of systematic theology; it is virtually nonexistent, therefore, among tradi-
tional theologians. Instead of skepticism, however, we sometimes do find a 
kind of subterfuge: A theologian may embrace, clearly and emphatically, two 
of the propositions and then try to waffle on the third, either by redefining a 
crucial term or simply by pretending to hold the third proposition in abeyance. 
Someone who embraces our first two propositions, for example, may try to 
ignore the third or to dismiss it with the comment: "The ultimate fate of the 
wicked is a mystery to be left in the hands of God." Another may reject 
proposition (1), which states that it is God's purpose to reconcile all sinners 
to himself, and then try to identify some artificial sense in which we can still 
say that God offers salvation to all. The fact is, however, that a theologian 
must reject at least one of the three propositions; and when we look carefully 
at a given theologian's writings, it is usually rather easy to say which one the 
theologian in fact rejects. We can therefore distinguish between three differ-
ent schools of thought: The Augustinians, because they believe strongly in 
both the sovereignty of God's will (proposition (2)) and the doctrine of eternal 
punishment (proposition (3)), finally reject the idea that God wills the salva-
tion of all (proposition (1)); the Arminians, named after Jacobus Arminius 
(1560-1609) for his opposition to the Calvinistic understanding of predesti-
nation and limited election, finally reject proposition (2); and the universal-
ists, because they embrace both (1) and (2), finally reject proposition (3). 
A point to bear in mind here is that the universalists are no different from 
the Augustinians and the Arminians in this regard: Every reflective Christian 
who takes a stand with respect to our three propositions must reject a propo-
sition for which there is at least some prima facie biblical support. Which-
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ever proposition one rejects, moreover, will have important implications for 
one's concept of the divine nature. If one rejects proposition (l), then one 
can no longer regard loving kindness as a part of God's very essence; one 
must concede, in other words, that God's love has definite limits and does 
not extend to all created persons. So the dispute over proposition (1), which 
implies that God loves all created persons enough to will their salvation, is 
perhaps the most important dispute concerning these propositions, because it 
goes to the very heart of who God is. But the dispute over propositions (2) 
and (3) also raises some important theological issues. Those who reject 
proposition (2) can no longer regard God as being sovereign or undefeated 
with respect to his own redemptive purposes; he simply does the best he can 
to cut his losses, to minimize the defeat, and to produce the best balance of 
good over evil that he can. Those who reject proposition (3), however, can 
continue to believe both that God's love is unlimited and that his redemptive 
purposes are unthwarted. 
So here, then, are three quite different pictures of God: According to the 
Augustinian picture, God's redemptive purposes are unthwarted, but he is 
limited in love; according to the Arminian picture, God's love is unlimited, 
but his redemptive purposes are thwarted by factors over which he has no 
control; and according to the universalist picture, God's love is unlimited and 
his redemptive purposes are unthwarted as well. Accordingly, a question that 
may now arise is this: Which of our three pictures best preserves the praise-
worthy character and the glory of the divine nature? 
Though we can find advocates in Western theology for each of the three 
pictures, it is probably fair to say, as a rough generalization, that the 
Augustinian picture has tended to dominate the thinking of theologians, the 
Arminian picture has been, perhaps, more popular among the Christian laity, 
and both the theologians and the laity have, for the most part, regarded the 
universalist picture as heretical. The latter point is hardly surprising, given 
that the state Church condemned universalism in the mid 6th century and 
suppressed it for nearly a thousand years; it was not until Christendom had 
become considerably fragmented in the 17th and 18th centuries that powerful 
voices on its behalf began to re-emerge. But despite the church pronounce-
ments of the past, those who regard universalism as not just mistaken, but 
heretical, are clearly in an awkward position. Why should it be heretical to 
believe that God is both almighty and perfectly loving? At the very least, 
those Christians who regard universalism as heretical must show that the 
biblical warrant for proposition (3) not only outweighs, but vas~ly (and per-
haps even obviously) outweighs, the biblical warrant for one of the other two 
propositions. And I know of no one who has even tried, much less succeeded, 
in building an overwhelming exegetical case of that kind. 
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Saving the Appearances 
We thus approach the difficult task of interpreting the Bible as a whole. It 
stands to reason that, once one of our three pictures captures the imagination 
of a given Christian thinker, it will have a profound effect on how that thinker 
puts together biblical ideas and interprets specific texts in the Bible. For as 
I have said, every Christian thinker must reject a proposition for which there 
is at least some prima facie biblical support; so as almost a practical necessity, 
virtually every Christian thinker (who looks to the Bible as an authority) will 
end up interpreting some texts, some documents, and some authors in light 
of others. 
As an illustration, consider how St. Augustine tries to handle the statement 
in I Timothy 2:4 that God "desires all men to be saved and to come to the 
knowledge of the truth." According to Augustine, this text 
does not mean that there is no one whose salvation he [God] doth not will . 
. . but by "all men" we are to understand the whole of mankind, in every 
single group into which it can be divided .... For from which of these groups 
doth not God will that some men from every nation should be saved through 
his only-begotten Son our Lord?2 
It is not God's will, in other words, to save every individual from every group 
and every nation; it is merely God's will, says Augustine, to save all kinds 
of people, that is, some individuals from every group and every nation. For 
does not the context of I Timothy 2:4 single out at least one group of people 
-namely, "kings and all who are in high positions" (2:2)-on behalf of whom 
prayers and supplications are requested? Seizing upon this reference, 
Augustine argues that God wills salvation only for the elect, only for some 
persons from all groups: "kings and subjects; nobility and plebeians; the high 
and the low; the learned and the unlearned; the healthy and the sick; the 
bright, the dull, and the stupid," etc. 3 To those of us who are not antecedently 
committed to the Augustinian picture, such an interpretation will no doubt 
seem fantastic; I think it fair to say, indeed, that it is fantastic. The text begins 
with an exhortation to offer prayers and supplications on behalf of "all men" 
(2: 1); it then singles out one group for a special reason: We should pray for 
kings and those in positions of authority, it says, so that "we may lead a quiet 
and peaceful life" (2:2); and finally, it gives this explanation of why it is 
fitting to pray for "all men": This is fitting, because God himself "desires 
all men to be saved" (2:4). That the author had a special, and quite under-
standable, reason for singling out one group of people for special men-
tion-namely, those in positions of authority, whose job it is to keep the 
peace-hardly seems to justify the Augustinian claim that "all men" really 
means "some men from all groups of people." 
But suppose that, on the basis of other texts from other contexts, one were 
antecedently committed to the Augustinian picture and therefore antecedently 
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committed to two propositIOns: first, that God's will cannot be defeated 
(proposition (2», and second, that eternal damnation will be the terrible fate 
of some persons (proposition (3». One might then find the following rea-
soning altogether tempting: Even though 1 Timothy 2:4 appears to say that 
God "desires all men to be saved," its real meaning, when taken in the context 
of the Bible as a whole, is merely that God wills the salvation of all kinds of 
people. For is that not at least a possible interpretation? If so, then even if 
the author did not have it explicitly in mind, it nonetheless remains what the 
Bible as a whole requires. Or, if that approach seems too artificial one might 
simply say with Augustine: "We could interpret it [I Timothy 2:4] in any 
other fashion, as long as we are not compelled to believe that the Omnipotent 
hath willed something to be done which was not done,,4-and as long as we 
are not compelled to believe, Augustine would no doubt add, that no one will 
be eternally damned. For if propositions (2) and (3) are true, then proposition 
(1) is false. It is as simple as that. 
We find the same pattern of interpretation in Calvin. Concerning I Timothy 
2:4, Calvin writes: 
How did it happen that God deprived many peoples of the light of his gospel 
while others enjoyed it? How did it happen that the pure recognition of the 
doctrine of godliness never came to some, while others barely tasted some 
obscure rudiments of it? From this it will be easy to determine the drift of 
Paul's reasoning [in I Timothy 2:4] .... Paul surely means only that God has 
not closed the door to any order [or class] of men .... 5 
And concerning Ezekiel 33: 11, Calvin writes: 
If God wills that all be saved, how does it come to pass that he does not open 
the door of repentance to the miserable men who would be better prepared 
to receive grace [than some who do receive it]? ... God is without doubt 
ready to forgive, as soon as a sinner is converted. Therefore, in so far as 
God wills the sinners repentance, he does not will his death. But experience 
teaches [my emphasis] that God wills the repentance of those whom he 
invites to himself, in such a way that he does not touch the hearts of all. 6 
So for Calvin, even as for Augustine, God does not really will that all be 
saved, and Calvin's argument may seem no less contrived and ad hoc than 
Augustine's. For here Calvin gives, it seems, a rather confused argument 
from experience merely for the purposes of overpowering a text. There could 
be a thousand reasons, after all, why God, even though he wills the salvation 
of all and will accomplish it in the end, does not save everyone at the same 
time-a thousand reasons why he leaves some in darkness longer than others. 
How is our limited and impoverished experience of such matters even rele-
vant to what God will do in the end? How is it even relevant to the meaning 
of the text in question? 
But however strained Calvin's argument may initially seem, we must again 
place it in the context of his commitment to the Augustinian picture. Because 
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he accepts propositions (2) and (3), he draws the inference that God does not 
save some of those whom God could have saved. He then merely asks the 
obvious question: If God does not save some of those whom God could have 
saved-if, for example, God has "deprived many peoples of the light of his 
gospel while others enjoyed it"-how can anyone contend that God really 
wills the salvation of all? In this way, Calvin simply deduces his interpretation 
of the text from the Augustinian picture which he brings to the text and thus 
imposes upon it. 
Perhaps we are now in a position to see why exegetical disputes between 
those who operate from different theological frameworks are apt to seem so 
futile. To Arminians and universalists, it will no doubt seem as if the 
Augustinians have simply rejected the plain teaching of Scripture that God 
at least wills the salvation of all. To Augustinians and Arminians, however, 
it will likewise seem as if the universalists have rejected the plain teaching 
of Scripture concerning the reality of eternal punishment. And to Augustini-
ans and universalists, it will seem as if the Arminians have rejected the plain 
teaching of Scripture that God is almighty in this sense: None of his redemp-
tive purposes can be thwarted. 
When fully developed, moreover, each of our three positions will include 
standard and well-rehearsed ways of handling its own set of difficult texts. 
Just as St. Augustine and Calvin interpret the statement that God "desires all 
men to be saved" to mean something like: "God desires all the elect-that 
is, some persons from all classes-to be saved," so the Arminians will inter-
pret the statement that God "accomplishes all things according to the counsel 
of his own will" to mean something like: "God accomplishes everything he 
is able to accomplish according to the counsel of his own will." And similarly 
for the universalists: They will interpret the statement that some sinners "will 
go away into eternal punishment" to mean something like: "In the coming 
age God himself will punish some sinners"; and they will deny in particular 
that the Greek expression" e l ~ 1C~ A (X a l v (X l W V l 0 v," which the King James 
Bible translates as "into everlasting punishment," carries any implication of 
unending punishment (see below for a fuller explanation). Each position, in 
other words, will have a standard way of "saving the appearances," of ex-
plaining (or explaining away) its own set of difficult texts in the Bible. 
A Closer Look at Proposition (3) 
There is, perhaps, a twofold reason why so many well-meaning Christians, 
all of whom look to the Bible as an authority, find it so difficult to come to 
an agreement on important theological matters: First, the Bible is not a single 
text with a single (human) author; it is instead a rich and diverse set of 
documents that appeal to the religious imagination in a variety of complex 
ways. Given the diversity of interests and writing styles of its various authors, 
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the history of some of its documents, and the variety of perspectives that it 
includes, a fertile imagination can almost always find a congenial way of 
putting things together. Even wildly implausible interpretations of specific 
texts are apt to seem utterly compelling to some, as the adherents of various 
religious cults sometimes illustrate. Second, the Bible is not a textbook in 
systematic theology either; it rarely, if ever, addresses our theological ques-
tions in a systematic way. Not even St. Paul does this with any degree of 
persistence. In any (traditional) systematic theology, we find systematic dis-
cussions of such Christian doctrines as the Incarnation, the Trinity, the Atone-
ment, and the Final Judgment, but we find nothing like that in the Bible, not 
even in the New Testament; and Christians now sometimes fail to appreciate, 
it seems to me, how easy it is simply to read the traditional formulation of 
these doctrines back into the New Testament. Why, I would ask at this point, 
were the controversies over these doctrines in the early church so 
heated?-and why were they finally resolved (for a season) not by New 
Testament exegesis, but by the power of the sword? Is not the obvious answer 
that honest and reasonable Christians, all of whom accepted the absolute 
authority of the Bible, began to read the New Testament in quite different 
ways? 
I do not mean to suggest here that every reading of the New Testament--or, 
more specifically, every reading of Paul-is as good as any other; far from 
it. Some things in the New Testament-for example, the Pauline claim that 
God raised Christ from the dead-seem to me clear and undeniable; and 
beyond that, the New Testament provides decisive grounds, I still believe, 
for choosing between our three pictures of God. But I do mean to suggest 
this: A theological interpretation of the Bible as a whole is as much an art, 
as much a work of the imagination, and as much a product of philosophical 
reasoning as it is of historical and linguistic study. Just as proponents of the 
geocentric theory of the solar system found many ways to account for the 
anomalous behavior of planets, so those who interpret the Bible from the 
perspective of a given system of theology inevitably find many ways to 
account for anomalous texts in the Bible. There is, no doubt, a point at which 
interpretation passes over into systematic distortion. But even in cases of 
systematic distortion, one cannot document such distortion simply by point-
ing to this or that text in the Bible. Neither can one undermine the apparent 
biblical warrant for any of our three pictures simply by pointing to its own 
set of difficult texts. Instead, one must tackle an entire system of interpre-
tation, a way of putting things together, including the theological and philo-
sophical assumptions that lie behind it; and one must somehow demonstrate 
a better way of putting things together. 
Now that, of course, is a huge undertaking and obviously beyond the scope 
of a single short paper. Accordingly, I shall now be content merely to illus-
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trate how a universalist might interpret some of the texts commonly cited on 
behalf of proposition (3). Most Christians today have some idea of how to 
put things together either from an Augustinian or from an Arminian perspec-
tive, but many have no clear idea of how to do so from a universalist per-
spective. And that more than anything else, I believe, explains the 
widespread assumption that universalism is heretical. It also explains why 
Christian philosophers have sometimes made such pronouncements as these: 
According to William Craig, "If we take Scripture [or the New Testament] 
seriously, we must admit that the vast majority of persons in the world are 
condemned and will be forever lost,,;7 and similarly, according to Peter Geach, 
"if the Gospel account [of the teaching of Jesus] is even approximately correct, 
then it is [my emphasis] that according to that teaching many men are irretriev-
ably lost.,,8 Remarkably, neither Craig nor Geach feel compelled even to tell us 
which texts in the New Testament, or which words of Jesus, they have in mind. 
They proceed instead as if this were unnecessary; as if their pronouncements 
were utterly uncontroversial; as if no reasonable person could interpret the New 
Testament, or certain texts in it, any differently than they do. 
But it is not as if the texts commonly cited on behalf of proposition (3) are 
especially clear or decisive. Quite apart from anything else, the mere fact 
that Geach appeals to the words of Jesus should perhaps raise a doubt in our 
minds. For as I have written elsewhere: 
Even a superficial reading of the Gospels reveals one point very clearly: 
Jesus steadfastly refused to address in a systematic way abstract theological 
questions, especially those concerning the age to come. His whole manner 
of expressing himself, the incessant use of hyperbole and riddle, of parable 
and colorful stories, was intended to awaken the spiritual imagination of his 
disciples and to leave room for reinterpretation as they matured in the faith; 
it was not intended to provide final answers to their theological questions.9 
Are we to take literally, for example, such words as these: "If anyone comes 
to me and does not hate his own father and mother and wife and children .. 
. , he cannot be my disciple" (Luke 14:26)? Clearly not. Most of us would 
recognize these words for what they are, hyperbole, and use our imagination 
to find a point which is compatible with our loving our "father and mother 
and wife and children." At the very least, therefore, Geach owes us some 
explanation of which words of Jesus he has in mind and why he takes them 
to imply that some persons will be "irretrievably lost"; he owes us something 
more than a dogmatic assertion at this point. 
Another philosopher who appeals to the words of Jesus is Richarfl Swinburne, 
who writes: 
It seems to me that the central point of New Testament teaching is that an 
eternal fate is sealed, at any rate for many, at death, a good fate for the good 
and a bad fate for the bad. This appears to be the main point of such parables 
as the sheep and the goats. 10 
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Now according to the parable of the sheep and the goats (Matthew 25 :31-46), 
the Son of man will one day return and separate the nations even as a shepherd 
might separate the sheep from the goats, placing the sheep at his right hand 
and the goats at his left. Those at his right hand will "inherit the kingdom" 
prepared for them, but those at his left will depart into the "eternal fire 
prepared for the devil and his angels." The parable ends with this parallel 
construction: "And they [the unrighteous] will go away into eternal punish-
ment, but the righteous into eternal life" (25:46). Evidently, then, it is this 
parallel construction which Swinburne takes to imply that "an eternal fate is 
sealed, at any rate for many, at death." 
Is Swinburne right about that? As he points out himself, Jesus never in-
tended for anyone to take the details of a parable literally; 11 the details merely 
provided a colorful background for the main point, which itself is not always 
easy to discern. So the first question we must ask is this: Just what is the 
main point of the parable of the sheep and the goats? Is it really a parable 
about the eternal destiny of the good and the bad, as Swinburne supposes? I 
doubt it. As I read the parable anyway, its main point (and truly startling 
message) is this: When we feed the hungry and provide drink for the thirsty, 
it is as if we are offering food and drink to Jesus himself; and when we refuse 
to do this, it is again as if we are refusing to offer it to Jesus himself. In 
order to make this point in a forceful way, Jesus tells a colorful story in which 
those who are judged are utterly surprised to discover the true nature of their 
own actions. The righteous ask: "Lord, when did we see thee hungry and 
feed thee, or thirsty and give thee drink?" (25 :37); and similarly, the unrigh-
teous ask: "Lord, when did we see thee hungry or thirsty or a stranger or 
naked or sick or in prison, and did not minister to thee?" (25:44). To which 
Jesus replies: "Truly, I say to you, as you did it to one of the least of these 
my brethren, you did it to me ... [And] as you did it not to one of the least 
of these, you did it not to me" (25:40,45). It is a powerful point about the 
inclusive character of love: how the interests of Jesus are so tightly interwo-
ven with those of his loved ones that any good which befalls them is a good 
which befalls him, and any evil which befalls them is an evil which befalls 
him. As is true of all parables, furthermore, we could easily draw all kinds 
of faulty inferences if we should take the details of this one too literally. We 
might conclude, for example, that eternal life is simply a reward for our own 
good works-something that Paul, at least, explicitly denies; or we might 
conclude that, whether we repent or not, any of us who have ever failed to 
meet our responsibilities to others-which is to say all of us-are destined 
for eternal punishment. Such inferences, however, would take us far beyond 
the main point of the story, as would the inference that everyone's "eternal 
fate" is sealed at death. The purpose of the story is to inform us that our 
actions, for good or ill, are more far reaching than we might have imagined, 
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and that we shall be judged accordingly; it is not to warn us concerning the 
ultimate fate of the wicked. 
Still, Jesus does say that the unrighteous go "into eternal punishment" 
("e1C;; K«Aao1v ipWV10V") even as the righteous go "into eternal life" 
("e 1 C;; ((,) 11 v ~ 1 W V 1 0 v"); and many, like Swinburne, do take that to be the 
main point of the parable. Their assumption here, in addition to an assump-
tion about the main point of the parable, is that "eternal punishment" is 
unending punishment even as "eternal life" is unending life. In the following 
section, however, I shall argue that our text in fact carries no such implication. 
Not only does it not imply that the punishment and the life are of equal 
duration; it may even imply that the two are not of equal duration. To see 
why this is so, we must examine the relevant concepts more carefully. 
Punishment in the Coming Age 
The Greek adjective that our English Bibles translate as "eternal" or "ever-
lasting" is "ip W v 1 0 C;;," which literally means "age-enduring" or perhaps 
"that which pertains to an age." As many commentators have pointed out, 
this adjective need not carry any implication of unending duration; in fact, 
the context may even preclude such an idea. When Paul speaks of a "mystery 
which was kept secret for long ages (x p« v 01 C;; ~ 1 W V 1 01 C;;) but is now 
disclosed" (Romans 16:25-26), he clearly supposes that an age-enduring mys-
tery or a mystery that endures for "eternal times" can come to an end; and if 
an age-enduring mystery can come to an end, so also, one might argue, can 
an age-enduring punishment. 
One could perhaps make too much of this point,12 however. For Paul's use 
of "~lWV10C;;" in Romans 16:25-where it refers neither to God nor to the 
actions of God-seems clearly exceptional. Given its more normal usage in 
the New Testament, the term has a good deal ofreligious meaning that it does 
not have in Romans 16:25. For Plato, at any rate, "~1WVlOC;;" clearly did 
mean "eternal" as opposed to "temporal"; it designated the timeless realm, 
that which exists without any temporal duration or change at all. And this 
Platonic use probably did influence the New Testament use to some extent: 
As Paul himself put it, "the things that are seen are transient, but the things 
that are unseen are eternal" (II Corinthians 4:18). For the New Testament 
writers, no less than for Plato, "~1WVlOC;;" applies, paradigmatically, to God 
himself (see the reference to "the eternal God" in Romans 16:26), to that 
which distinguishes the incorruptible God and his incorruptible realm from 
the things that undergo change and corruption in time. I do not mean to imply 
that the New Testament writers took over the Platonic idea of an utterly 
timeless eternity, but I do mean to imply that their use of "CpWVlOC;;" was 
roughly Platonic in this sense: Whether God is eternal (that is, timeless, 
outside of time) in the Platonic sense or everlasting in the sense that he 
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endures throughout all of the ages, nothing other than God is eternal in the 
primary sense. Other things-for example, the gifts, possessions, and actions 
of God-are eternal in the secondary sense that they have their causal source 
in the eternal God himself. Accordingly, when the letter of Jude describes 
the fire which consumed Sodom and Gomorrah as "eternal fire," the point is 
not that the fire literally burns forever without consuming the cities; it is not 
that the fire continues to burn even today. The point is that the fire is a form 
of divine judgment upon those cities, a foreshadowing of eschatological judg-
ment, which has its causal source in the eternal God himself. And similarly 
for Jesus' reference to "eternal fire" in Matthew 25:41 and to "eternal pun-
ishment" in Matthew 25:46. The fire to which he alludes is not eternal in 
the sense that it burns forever without consuming anything-without consum-
ing, for example, that which is false within a person (see I Corinthians 
3: 15)-and neither is the punishment eternal in the sense that it continues 
forever without accomplishing its corrective purpose. Both the fire and the 
punishment are eternal in the sense that they have their causal source in the 
eternal God himself. For anything that the eternal God does is eternal in the 
sense that it is the eternal God who does it. 13 
Even as "eternal punishment" is that form of punishment that has its causal 
source in the eternal God, so "eternal life" is that mode of living that has its 
causal source in the eternal God. In the Gospel of John, we thus read: "And 
this is eternal life, that they know thee the only true God, and Jesus Christ 
whom thou hast sent" (17:3). Here too, then, the emphasis is upon the special 
quality, not the duration, of a life in proper relationship with God. But there 
is more. The Gospel writers thought in terms of two ages, the present age 
and the age to come, and they associated the age to come with God himself; 
it was an age in which God's presence would be fully manifested, his purposes 
fully realized, and his redemptive work eventually completed. They therefore 
came to employ the term, "Ct:1WV10<;," as an eschatological term, one that 
functioned as a handy reference to the realities of the age to come. In this 
way, they managed to combine the more literal sense of "that which pertains 
to an age" with the more religious sense of "that which manifests the presence 
of God in a special way." Eternal life, then, is not merely life that comes 
from God; it is also the mode of living associated with the age to come. And 
similarly for eternal punishment: It is not merely punishment that comes 
from God; it is also the form of punishment associated with the age to come. 
Now in none of this is there any implication that the life which comes from 
God and the punishment which comes from God are of an equal duration. I 
stress this because people sometimes mistakenly argue in the following way: 
If eternal punishment does not literally last forever, then neither does eternal 
life. D. P. Walker puts the objection this way: 
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it could be argued that the 'everlasting fire' and 'everlasting punishment' (1: 0 
ltUP 1:0 <pwv\Ov, K~Aaa\<; 9:\WV\o<;) ... did not necessarily mean 
that their torments would be eternal, since the word it- \ W V \ 0 <; or its Hebrew 
equivalent is often used elsewhere in the Bible in contexts where it cannot 
mean an infinite period of time, as for example in Jude 6, where it is applied 
to the fire which destroyed Sodom and Gomorrah. But this interpretation is 
highly improbable, since Christ is clearly drawing a parallel between the 
eternity of bliss awaiting the sheep and the eternity of misery awaiting the 
goats. It can only stand if one also denies eternal life to the saved .... 14 
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There are, I believe, three mistakes here: First, Jesus is not comparing the 
duration of the punishment with the duration of the life; he is comparing a 
form of punishment that has its causal source in the eternal God with a mode 
of life that has its causal source in the eternal God. The issue of temporal 
duration is not at issue here and not relevant to the main point of the parable. 
Second, the Christian hope of immortality does not rest upon the translation 
of the Greek "cp W v 1 0 ~"; it rests instead upon the doctrine of the resurrec-
tion (see John 6:40) and that of God's unchanging love for us. And finally, 
when we look more closely at the relevant nouns, we encounter a strong 
reason to believe that the life lasts longer than the punishment. 
Whereas eternal life, being rightly related to God, is an end in itself, eternal 
punishment (K~ A a a 1 <; ~ 1 W V 1 o~) is a means to an end. Ajust punishment, 
even when it has a retributivist flavor to it, is always, I would argue, a means 
of correction. But quite apart from that, the Gospel writer employs a word 
that is, according to the Greek scholar William Barclay, specifically a word 
for remedial punishment; "in all Greek secular literature," says Barclay, "ko-
lasis is never used of anything but remedial punishment.,,15 The etymology 
of the word is especially intriguing, because it "was not originally an ethical 
word at all. It originally meant the pruning of trees to make them grow 
better.,,16 According to this (relatively conservative) Greek scholar, there-
fore, "Eternal punishment is ... literally that kind of remedial punishment 
which it befits God to give and which only God can give."l7 Being remedial, 
the punishment is intended as a means of correction, a means to the end of 
eternal life; so it is, if you will, an eternal means of correction. It is eternal 
both in the sense that its causal source lies in the eternal God himself and in 
the sense that its corrective effects last forever. But as a means to an end, it 
need not last any longer than is necessary to produce the end for whose sake 
it exists in the first place. 
Accordingly, there are several senses, compatible with New Testament 
usage, in which a punishment of limited duration could still be eternal. There 
is even a perfectly natural sense in which such terms as "eternal," "everlast-
ing," and "forever," particularly when used in the context of punishment or 
judgment, sometimes indicate the intensity (and quality) of an experience 
rather than. its duration. ("The dull after dinner speech simply dragged on 
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forever!") In the Old Testament story of Jonah, we thus find Jonah praying 
as follows from the belly of the great fish which had swallowed him: "I went 
down to the land whose bars closed upon me for ever [my emphasis]; yet 
thou didst bring up my life from the Pit, 0 Lord my God" (Jonah 2:6). Do 
we not have here a perfect analogue for a Christian understanding of hell? 
Jonah too was "cast out" from the presence of the Lord (2:6); and like Jonah, 
whose punishment, according to the story, included being cast into the depths 
of the sea, perhaps a myriad others will one day exclaim: "I went down into 
hell, whose gates closed upon me forever; yet thou didst bring up my life 
from the Pit, 0 Lord my God." 
Conclusion 
One of my purposes in this paper has been to illustrate how Christian uni-
versalists might handle their own set of difficult texts in the Bible. I make 
no claim of finality for any of the suggestions I have made. Nor have I tried 
here, as I have elsewhere, to set forth the positive case for a universalist 
reading of the New Testament. IS For though that positive case seems to me 
overwhelming, it is not likely to convince any Christian who supposes, for 
example, that Jesus himself believed in eternal punishment. In this paper, 
therefore, I have argued that we can plausibly understand the New Testament 
idea of eternal punishment in a way that carries no implication of unending 
duration. I9 I have also argued that, from the perspective of New Testament 
interpretation, the Augustinians and the Arminians, no less than the univer-
salists, face their own sets of difficult texts in the Bible. Indeed, anyone who 
takes a stand with respect to our three propositions must, in the end, reject a 
proposition for which there is at least some prima facie biblical support. 
Accordingly, one cannot undermine the biblical warrant for universalism 
simply by pointing to a few texts which may, on their face, seem inconsistent 
with it. One must also show that the texts cited on behalf of proposition (3) 
are clearer, more systematic, and more decisive than those which the univer-
salist cites on behalf of propositions (1) and (2). One must tackle, in other 
d . f' . 20 wor s, an entlfe system 0 lllterpretatlOn. 
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If my exegetical claim is correct, however, then it is not my notion of eternity, but the 
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Father who died on the cross; and it is the Father, not the Son, who declared, "This is my 
beloved Son, with whom I am well pleased" (Matthew 3: 17). Actions attributed to one 
person in the Trinity, in other words, are not always attributed to all three; indeed, that 
seems to be the whole point of distinguishing between different persons in the Trinity. 
But perhaps Christians would also want to attribute some actions to the Trinity as a whole. 
In that case, it would seem perfectly appropriate to say that whatever the Trinity as a whole 
does is itself triune in this sense: It expresses the united will and the causal activity of not 
just one person, but all three persons, in the Trinity. How much sense we arc able to make 
of this will depend, of course, on how much sense we are able to make of the Trinity itself. 
14. D. P. Walker, The Decline of Hell: Seventeenth Century Discussions of Eternal 
Torment (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1964), p. 20. 
15. William Barclay, A Spiritual Autobiography (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1977), p. 
66. 
16. Ibid. 
17. Ibid. 
18. See Thomas Talbott, "The New Testament and Universal Reconciliation," Christian 
Scholar's Review XXI:4 (June, 1992), pp. 376-394. 
19. In this paper, I have concentrated on the words of Jesus in the parable of the sheep 
and the goats. For a discussion of the expression "eternal destrution," as it appears in II 
Thessalonians 1:9, see "Universal Reconciliation," pp. 389-393. 
20. My thanks to an anonymous referee for several comments on the paper. 
